A Clean Canada in a Dirty World: The Cost of Climate-Related Border Measures by Benjamin Dachis
e-brief
A Clean Canada in a Dirty World: 

































 As the federal government weighs policy options for reducing greenhouse gases, 
the question arises as to how to treat imported goods from countries with less
stringent emission targets. One policy option is to impose a “carbon tariff” on
imported goods from those countries.
 The imposition of such a border adjustment, however, would have serious
drawbacks. The largest share of the burden of any Canadian trade action would 
be imposed on US imports, not developing countries.
 An extra cost imposed on imports would ripple through the economy, and onto final
consumers, and would put Canadian firms at a cost disadvantage in foreign markets.
The author would like to thank Roland Ismer for his helpful discussions of early versions of this work and Finn Poschmann,
Alex Laurin, Aaron Cosbey, Richard Morgenstern, and especially Colin Busby for helpful comments. Thanks also to Nic
Rivers for providing research results that were used in the analysis. The author assumes all responsibility for this paper.
1 See Hufbauer (1996) or Orzechowski (2001) for a comprehensive review of border-tax adjustments (BTAs).
The failure of the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen to reach a binding global 
agreement to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) raises the prospect of a world with fragmented national
climate policies. Canada, for example, currently has plans for an intensity based cap-and-trade system intended
to reduce emissions by 20 percent relative to 2006 levels by 2020 (Government of Canada 2008). A related
policy issue for the federal government is how to treat imported goods from countries with less stringent
emissions targets. 
One policy option is to make domestic and foreign producers pay the same amount for carbon emissions,
known as a carbon border adjustment.
1However, this e-brief argues that a carbon border adjustment, often
referred to as a carbon tariff, should not be considered as part of Canada’s cap-and-trade proposal.
The imposition of a border adjustment would have many drawbacks. It would face numerous hurdles for
World Trade Organization (WTO) compliance. A border adjustment would also be largely unnecessary because
most Canadian exports will likely not be subject to US border adjustments, and an equivalent Canadian border
adjustment would apply mostly to US goods. Canada, with its numerous global-supply-chain producers, would
have much to lose from carbon border adjustments and little to gain. Carbon Border Adjustments
A carbon border adjustment would levy a charge on foreign producers of imported goods equivalent to the costs imposed
on domestic producers for carbon emissions. This would reflect the carbon permit costs determined through a cap-and-
trade system.
2For example, if carbon permits in Canada traded at a price of $100 per tonne of CO2produced, and an
imported good released two tonnes of CO2in its production, the border adjustment on that good would be $200. The
adjustment would apply to imports and/or could involve rebates to domestic exporters for the carbon emission costs they
have already paid.
3
In the future, without global cooperation to reduce emissions, Canada will import from countries that charge producers
for carbon emissions and other nations that do not. Canadian producers of goods that emit a large amount of carbon in the
production process and compete with foreign producers that do not face a carbon price are likely to be at a competitive
disadvantage. Previous literature, however, has found that most relative competitiveness impacts would be assuaged by
Canada-US harmonization of carbon policy, with little loss to Canadian production as a result of companies relocating to
countries that do not impose carbon pricing (Bataille et al, 2009). Most of the predicted production loss from Canada would
be gained by the United States, not by developing countries whose goods are often perceived as targets of border adjustment. 
WTO Compliance of a Carbon Border Adjustment
Border adjustments may meet the international requirements for trade legislation, but the details of any proposed carbon
border adjustment will raise the issue of WTO compliance.
4The following issues arise: 
• Imports must be treated no less favourably than ‘like’ domestic goods, a difficult matter of definition in itself (Cosbey
2008); 
￿ “Most Favoured Nation” clauses prohibit discrimination among trade partners;
￿ Carbon tariffs may also be considered under Article XX of GATT, which allows for general exceptions “necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health…if such measures are made in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.” (Fischer and Fox 2009). 
Border-tax adjustments (BTAs), as defined by WTO law, are intended for consumption taxes, not carbon permits. For carbon
permits, what matters is the method of distribution (Green 2009): emissions permits could be freely allocated to
producers or purchased through a government auction. The key defining feature of a tax in the eyes of international law is
the existence of a payment to the government (de Cendra 2006). Hence, a full auction of permits would be necessary to
potentially meet this definition of a ‘tax.’ 
The other possible application of a border adjustment – rebating domestic producers for carbon abatement costs in the
production of exported goods – could be considered over-compensation if polluters do not pay for their emissions permits,
making an export rebate from government a subsidy. An export rebate would need to be coupled with a purchase of
emissions credits or a carbon tax to be admissible under WTO rules (Ismer and Neuhoff 2007). 
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2 This border adjustment is often a tax, but can also be a requirement to purchase an emissions credit. The requirement to purchase a
permit may be a regulation, but the economic impact is largely the same as a border adjustment (Cosbey 2008).
3 Canada applies the Goods and Services Tax (GST) on imports but the tax is not levied on Canadian exports. Exporters are still able to
collect input tax credits for their GST paid.
4 A full discussion of WTO treatment of border adjustments is outside the scope of this e-brief. See Hufbauer et al (2009) for an excellent
summary of the WTO issues relevant to BTAs.INDEPENDENT REASONED RELEVANT
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5 BTAs will not apply to countries responsible for less than 0.5 percent of world emissions or less than 5 percent of US imports in a given
sector or to ‘least developed countries.’
6 Fickling and Schott (2009) suggest that the current NAFTA does not by itself protect Canadian exports to the US from the imposition
of US border adjustments.
7 The broadly defined Canadian pulp and paper industry is more carbon intensive than the equivalent sector in the US because of much
higher energy intensity of production, despite the low carbon intensity of electricity and pulping liquor as energy sources (Bataille et al
2009). These relative GHG intensity calculations assume that electricity emission intensities are used in calculating total sectoral emission
intensities. Using only facility-own emissions, many more Canadian industries would have higher GHG-intensities than the United States.
8 I link total industry emissions to provincial industry gross output and provincial industry-level international trade. Provincial output is a
proxy for facility-level output because provincial output is the finest level of detail that is publicly available. All datasets were merged on
six-digit NAICS codes but results are aggregate to the four-digit level. Some corrections were made for slightly inconsistent coding of
industrial categories. I also assume that Canadian businesses change their behaviour after the imposition of a carbon price and the border
tax adjustment. Emission levels, output, exports, and imports will all be different from the business-as-usual trend after the introduction
of a carbon price and any trade measures. I apply the estimated percentage change in these variables for Canadian (not foreign)
production relative to the business-as-usual scenario found in Rivers (2008). The policy scenario modeled is for the year 2020, with an
import tariff at a level that will prevent imports in any sector from increasing by more than 10 percent or exports decreasing by more
than 10 percent. The percentage change by industry category found in the previous analysis was then matched to the closest equivalent in
the Canadian and international data.
9 Facility-level reporting of GHG emissions from Environment Canada is used to estimate the amount of emissions by industry and
province. Facility-level emissions are available from Environment Canada at
http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/ghg/onlinedata/DataAndReports_e.cfm 
10 This analysis focuses only on emissions-intensive, trade-exposed manufacturing industries. This excludes the electricity, petroleum and
oil-and-gas sectors. Electrical and oil-and-gas sector emissions are likely to be treated separately in a border adjustment scheme. 
The Effect of US Legislation on Canada
Regardless of WTO law requirements, the US has plans to impose border adjustments. In June 2009, the United States House of
Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES). The bill, although not yet law, proposes an
economy-wide cap on carbon emissions. Furthermore, the bill proposes a requirement for importers to purchase US credits for
foreign emissions as early as 2020, but only under specific conditions.
The first condition is that the US would not impose any border measures if a binding international agreement is in place
(Bradbury 2009).
5Without an international agreement, however, ACES would impose no US border measures if 85 percent of
imported goods in a specific sector are from countries that meet at least one of the following three criteria:
￿ The country is party to an international agreement with the US and has emissions targets at least as stringent as the US;
￿ The country is party to a multi-lateral or bilateral sectoral agreement with the US suspending border measures;
6or
￿ Imports in the trading partner’s sector have GHG intensities that are equivalent or below the US sector’s GHG intensities.
Based on current GHG-intensities and 2007 export levels, the last criterion would exempt 89 percent of Canadian trade from US
border adjustments, leaving only the pulp and paper broad sector potentially vulnerable to US border measures because of higher
Canadian GHG-intensities than those in US production.
7
A Canadian Carbon Border Adjustment 
What would a Canadian border adjustment, similar to the US example, look like for industries and provinces? I estimate total
revenues from a border adjustment (both from the import and export component) and determine what importers would need to
pay to send goods to Canada as a percentage of total industry import value (Table 1).
8I assume that large emitters must purchase
emissions credits from government and that this border measure only applies to goods whose domestic large final emitters are
covered by the current emissions reporting system.
9
A hypothetical $100 per tonne carbon price would create a carbon market of approximately $4.5 to $5 billion amongst large
final emitters in industries outside of the oil and gas and electricity sector. I assume that in response to a carbon price, Canadian
producers reduce their production, imports and exports along the lines estimated by Rivers (2008).
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I assume importing firms pay a rate equal to average domestic emissions intensity, not actual foreign emissions. The estimates
in Table 1 do not include the possibility of exemption for some imports. This is thus an upper bound estimate on the impact of
border adjustments. 
The best measure of the relative cost of a border adjustment on trade is the value of the revenue from import tariffs as a share of
industry imports. The good most affected by an import tariff would be cement, where every dollar of imported cement would have 63
cents of tariff levied. Other carbon-intensive sectors, such as lime, aluminum products, and metal ore mining would be subject to
import tariffs of over 5 percent of the value of imports. A rebate of all Canadian emissions permit costs on exports, similar to that
proposed by ACES, would return more money to Canadian exporters than would be collected on imports (columns 2 and 3),
resulting in a windfall for many domestic producers, but at the expense of domestic consumers, taxpayers and importing firms.
11
Although not reported in the table below, Ontario and Quebec producers would bear a considerably heavier burden of import
border adjustments as firms in these provinces import goods that would likely be subject to more border adjustments than western
Canadian firms. An import tariff would represent about 1.7 percent of the total value of Ontario and Quebec imports subject to a
border adjustment, but would only be 0.3 percent of the value of Alberta imports. 
11 Canada is one of the few OECD countries to have exports that are more carbon intensive than imports (Nakano et al 2009).
Industry Value of domestic emissions ($Millions) Export border adjustment ($Millions) Import border
Table 1: Export Rebate and Import Border Adjustment Based on Industry Average Emissions Intensity, 
$100 per Tonne, 2004 Output Levels and Dollars
Sources: Author’s calculations from Industry Canada. “Trade Data Online,” Environment Canada Facility GHG Reporting, CANSIM Table 381-0015.










Adjustment as percent 
of Industry Imports
Cement 945 170 55 63.2
Lime 205 6 5 27.2
Iron and steel mills and ferro-alloy 1,120 356 790 11.6
Alumina and aluminum 564 440 165 9.6
Metal ore mining 221 226 80 7.4
Pesticides and fertilizer 397 114 48 3.6
Non-metallic mineral mining and quarrying 42 51 0 2.3
Non-ferrous metal (except aluminum)
smelting and refining
31 26 1 2.0
Non-metallic mineral mining and quarrying 180 149 47 1.9
Pulp, paper and paperboard mills 459 156 54 1.3
Glass 23 2 15 1.2
Food manufacturing 27 8 8 0.5
Basic chemicals 490 15 28 0.3
Steel foundries 1 0 0 0.1
Resin and synthetic rubber 5 2 3 0.1
Automobile manufacturing 38 29 16 0.1
Total 4,746 1,752 1,314 1.9Of the estimated $1.3 billion that would be collected from an import border adjustment nearly $800 million would be levied
on US imports (Table 2). The proceeds of a border adjustment would represent a larger share of the value of affected trade from
developing countries without strict climate controls, but would represent only approximately 15 percent of total import border
adjustments collected.
12
Importantly, all of the above results only estimate the impact of hypothetical border adjustments on basic goods, such as iron
or aluminum, and not on the production of manufactured goods that use imported products as inputs. A border adjustment would
therefore protect domestic producers of these basic goods, but would harm domestic manufacturers who use imported products
as inputs. An extra cost imposed on imports would ripple throughout the economy onto final consumers and would put Canadian
firms at a cost disadvantage in foreign markets. Many Canadian firms are integrated into global supply chains, adding value at many
stages of production. The adversely affected sectors represent a much larger share of total Canadian trade than do firms producing
basic goods (Beckman and Goldfarb 2007), and tracking embodied emissions in value chains would create significant challenges.
Conclusion
While few Canadian sectors are likely to face a US border measure, the largest share of the burden of any Canadian trade action
would be imposed on US imports. Most competitiveness issues arising for Canadian firms that would be affected by domestic
carbon reduction policies should, preferably, be dealt with through harmonizing Canada and US climate policies. A border
measure applied to Canadian imports and exports would be difficult to implement and, on the whole, do more harm than good 
in terms of rising costs for Canadian producers and consumers. It would set a dangerous precedent for a small, open trading
nation like Canada, and should therefore not be part of any potential Canadian policy to reduce carbon emissions.
12 The proceeds of a border adjustment that attempts to estimate actual foreign emissions would be a much larger share of trade with developing
countries and would be more trade distortionary (Mattoo et al 2009).
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Table 2: Import Border Adjustments, by Country, 2004 Trade Levels
Notes: a: Developing includes Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Russia, South Africa and Turkey.
b: Oceanic and East Asia includes Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong. 
Estimated import border adjustments collected are different than those estimated in Table 1 because this table is limited to only major trading partners,
whereas the industry-level estimate is calculated for all trade. 
Sources: Author’s calculations from Industry Canada “Trade Data Online,” Environment Canada Facility GHG Reporting, CANSIM Table 381-0015.
Region Import Border Adjustments 
as Percentage of Value 
of Affected Trade
Import Border Adjustments 






a 3.6 0.3 187 
Oceanic and East Asia
b 1.4 0.4 101 
EU 2.4 0.3 141 
United States 2.0 0.4 791 
Total 2.1 0.3 1,220 INDEPENDENT REASONED RELEVANT
e-brief /6
This e-brief is a publication of the C.D. Howe Institute.
Benjamin Dachis is a Policy Analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute.
For more information call Benjamin Dachis at 416-865-1904.
This e-brief is available at www.cdhowe.org.
Permission is granted to reprint this text if the content is not altered and proper attribution is provided.
References
Bataille, Chris, Benjamin Dachis, and Nic Rivers. 2009. “Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Impact on Canada’s Competitiveness.” C.D.
Howe Institute Commentary. C.D. Howe Institute: Toronto.
Beckman, Kip and Danielle Goldfarb. 2007. “Canada’s Changing Role in Global Supply Chains.” The Conference Board of Canada. March. 
Bradbury, James. 2009. “Carbon Leakage Provisions in US Climate Policy.” Western Climate Initiative. Washington, DC. November.
Cosbey, Aaron. 2008. “Border Carbon Adjustments.” International Institute for Sustainable Development. August. 
de Cendra, Javier. 2006. “Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An Analysis vis-à-vis WTO Law” Review of
European Community & International Environmental Law 15 (2): 131-145.
Fischer, C., and A. K. Fox. 2009. “Comparing Policies to Combat Emissions Leakage: Border Tax Adjustments versus Rebates.” Resources for the
Future Discussion Paper.  
Green, Andrew. 2009. “Climate Change, Competitiveness and International Trade.” Presentation at CRA International Conference, Canada’s
Climate Agenda.
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde. 1996. Fundamental Tax Reform and Border Tax Adjustments. Washington DC. Policy Institute for International Economics,
Analyses in International Economics 43.
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Steve Charnovitz and Jisun Kim. 2009. Global Warming and the World Trading System. Peterson Institute for International
Economics: Washington DC. 
Ismer, Roland, Karsten Nuehoff. 2007. “Border Tax Adjustment: a Feasible Way to Support Stringent Emission Trading.” European Journal of Law
and Economics 24: 137-164.
Government of Canada. 2008. “Turning the Corner: Regulatory Framework for Industrial Greenhouse Gas Emissions.” March.
Mattoo, Aaditya, Arvind Subramanian, Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, Jianwu He. 2009. “Reconciling Climate Change and Trade Policy.” The
World Bank, Development Research Group, Trade and Integration Team, Policy Research Working Paper 5123. November.
Nakano, Satoshi, Asako Okamura, Norihisa Sakurai, Masayuki Suzuki, Yoshiaki Tojo, Norihiko Yamano. 2009. “The Measurement of CO2
Embodiments in International Trade: Evidence from the Harmonised Input-Output and Bilateral Trade Database,” OECD Science,
Technology and Industry Working Papers, 2009/3. OECD publishing.
Orzechowski, William. 2001. “Border Tax Adjustments and Fundamental Tax Reform.” The Tax Foundation, Background Paper No. 39.
Rivers, Nic. 2008. “Draft Report: General Equilibrium Modeling of Climate Policies in Canada.” Prepared for the National Roundtable on the
Environment and the Economy. Ottawa.
Fickling, Meera, and Jeffrey Schott. 2009. “NAFTA and Climate Change: Legislate Nationally, Cooperate Regionally.” Presented at C.D. Howe
Conference “The Costs and Benefits of an Integrated North American Cap-and-Trade Carbon Policy.” Calgary, Alberta. October.